concept-transitional-space

过渡空间与过渡现象（transitional space / transitional objects and phenomena）

类型: concept
创建时间: 2026-08-29
最后更新: 2026-08-29
主来源: ogden-ontological-psychoanalysis、govrin-interpretation、eshel-withness

摘要

过渡空间（transitional space）是温尼科特为精神分析开辟的第三领域：它既不属于内在心理现实，也不属于外在世界，而是两者共同贡献、彼此分离又相互关联的区域。游戏、文化、艺术与宗教经验都从中诞生。奥格登径直把它称为温尼科特「对本体论精神分析最重要的贡献」。

这一概念的认识论后果远比它的临床用途更激进。过渡空间的核心规定是它不被质疑（is not challenged）：关于过渡客体究竟是「被婴儿创造的」还是「从外部被给予的」，这一问题必须不被提出。温尼科特的健康定义因此是一个不可消解的悖论——客体既是被创造的，又早已在那里等着被发现；任何以其巧妙而消解此悖论的重述，都是对它的破坏。

本页处理三条线索：过渡空间与奥格登分析性第三方（analytic third）的理论亲缘；「不追问真假」这一认识论姿态与精神分析真理问题的关系；以及埃谢尔（Ofra Eshel）对同一地带的更激进占用——她认为「临在（presencing）」甚至超出主体间性，触及的是更原初的环境性关联。

一、定义：第三领域

奥格登引温尼科特 1971 年〈过渡客体与过渡现象〉一文给出了本组文献中最完整的定义性表述：

Perhaps Winnicott’s most significant contribution to ontological psychoanalysis is his concept of “transitional objects and phenomena” (1971c), which he describes as:

… an intermediate state of experiencing, to which inner reality and external life both contribute. It is an area that is not challenged, because no claim is made on its behalf except that it shall exist as a resting-place for the individual engaged in the perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality separate yet interrelated. [p. 2]

— Ogden, Ontological，第二节「II. BEING ALIVE, FEELING ALL THE SENSE OF REAL」（引 Winnicott, 1971c）

四要件值得拆开：

要件	含义
中间性	内在现实与外部生活共同贡献——不是二者的混合，而是二者之外的第三项
不被质疑	对它的唯一要求是「它存在」；不提出真假主张
歇息之所	它的功能是供个体停靠，而非供分析师解读
分离且互相关联	它服务于「保持内在与外在现实既分离又相互关联」这一永久任务

奥格登随即指出，婴儿这方面的能力要求母亲（或分析师）有对应的存在状态——这是一个双向规定，不是单方面的技术：

The infant or child’s capacity to develop a “state of being” (Winnicott 1971c, p. 14) bound up with experiencing transitional objects and phenomena requires a corresponding state of being on the part of the mother (or the analyst)

— Ogden, Ontological，第二节

并且，奥格登明确拒绝把母婴关系当作单纯的育儿学：

(When Winnicott speaks of the mother-infant relationship, he is using this as a metaphor that not only includes the mother-infant relationship, but also the analyst-patient relationship as well as every other significant relationship experienced by infants, children, and adults.)

— Ogden, Ontological，第二节

二、核心规定：问题不被提出

这是过渡空间最容易被误解、也最激进的一点。奥格登引用了温尼科特那段著名的约定：

… it is a matter of agreement between us and the baby that we will never ask the question: ‘ Did you conceive of this [object] or was it presented to you from without?’ The important point is that no decision on this point is expected. The question is not to be formulated. [Winnicott 1971c, p. 12, italics in the original]

— Ogden, Ontological，第二节（引 Winnicott, 1971c, p. 12，原文着重）

请注意原文的三重推进：（一）永不问这个问题（never ask the question）；（二）不期待对此作出任何裁决（no decision on this point is expected）；（三）问题本身不应被表述出来（The question is not to be formulated）。这不只是「暂缓判断」，而是把问题的可表述性本身取消掉。

三、悖论：既非「被发现的」，亦非「被创造的」

温尼科特的健康定义是一个必须被维持而非被解决的悖论：

In health the infant creates what is in fact lying around waiting to be found. But in health the object is created, not found … This has to be accepted as a paradox, and not solved by a restatement that, by its cleverness, seems to eliminate the paradox. [Winnicott 1963, p. 181, italics in the original]

— Ogden, Ontological，第二节（引 Winnicott, 1963, p. 181，原文着重）

这里的措辞极不寻常：「在健康中，婴儿创造了事实上就在那里等着被发现的东西」，紧接着又断言「客体是被创造的，不是被发现的」。奥格登特别引了后半句警示：任何以其巧妙而似乎消解了悖论的重述，都必须被拒绝。这直接禁止了三种常见的理论操作：把它还原为投射（那是「只创造了」）、把它还原为知觉（那是「只发现了」）、或用辩证法「扬弃」（那是用聪明消灭悖论）。

Govrin 在第四章独立复述了同一悖论，并称之为温尼科特的根本悖论（the essential paradox）：

As Abram (2012) notes, this centers on what Winnicott called “the essential paradox”: the object that the infant finds was created by the infant, yet existed all along waiting to be found (Winnicott, 1989).

— Govrin, Interpretation，第四章「The Paradox of Psychological Birth」

其发生机制被 Govrin 描述为一种错觉（illusion），且这种错觉是发展的成就而非病理：

This requires what Winnicott called “illusion”—the temporary experience of creating what one finds, of finding what one creates. Such illusion depends entirely on environmental responsiveness.

— Govrin, Interpretation，第四章

临床上，母亲在婴儿开始需要的那一刻呈上乳房，婴儿于是体验到自己创造了满足饥饿之物——这是「一切后来的创造力、自发性与现实投入的基础」（Govrin, Interpretation，第四章）。

四、游戏与文化：过渡空间的下游

奥格登把过渡空间明确的产物列了出来：

This state of being underlies “the intense experiencing that belongs to the arts and to religion and to imaginative living” (Winnicott 1971c, p. 14).

— Ogden, Ontological，第二节

而过渡空间在临床中的直接形态是游戏。奥格登引温尼科特：

Psychotherapy takes place in the overlap of two areas of playing, that of the patient and that of the therapist. The corollary to this is that where playing is not possible then the work done by the therapist is directed towards bringing the patient from a state of not being able to play into a state of being able to play. [Winnicott 1971a, p. 38, italics in the original]

— Ogden, Ontological，第一节（引 Winnicott, 1971a, p. 38，原文着重）

【综合】这给出了一条清晰的谱系：过渡空间 → 两个游戏区域的重叠 → 心理治疗发生之处。心理治疗不在任何一方的内心，而在那块重叠区。治疗的首要任务因此不是理解，而是使游戏成为可能——先要把病人从「不能玩」的状态带到「能玩」的状态。

奥格登还特别表彰了温尼科特为这一过程发明的语言：

Winnicott (1971c), almost in passing, in his “Transitional object” paper, uses a phrase that I view as the process underlying successful psychoanalysis and every other form of psychic growth: we “weave other-than-me objects into the personal pattern” (p. 3).

— Ogden, Ontological，第一节（引 Winnicott, 1971c, p. 3）

Winnicott, here, in developing the ontological aspect of psychoanalysis, is inventing language as he goes—“to weave other-than-me objects into the personal pattern”—a way of speaking about psychic growth that I have never come across anywhere else.

— Ogden, Ontological，第一节

Govrin 则给出了过渡空间的另一侧规定——游戏的对立面不是工作，而是强制：

The insight that “the opposite of play is not work but coercion” (Phillips, 1988, p. 138) transforms how we understand interpretive intervention.

— Govrin, Interpretation，第四章（引 Phillips, 1988, p. 138）

五、「不追问真假」与精神分析的认识论姿态

过渡空间的「不被质疑」规定，与精神分析整个真理问题直接相关。在温尼科特那里，这一姿态落实为一系列反直觉的诠释技术。

（一）诠释是用来标示理解之界限的：

Bonaminio (2012) also illuminates this through Winnicott’s radical insight: “I think I interpret mainly to let the patient know the limits of my understanding” (Winnicott, 1963, p. 189).

— Govrin, Interpretation，第四章（引 Winnicott, 1963, p. 189）

（二）分析师刻意保持不准确：

He notes, with characteristic playfulness, that he interprets because “if I make none the patient gets the impression that I understand everything. In other words, I retain some outside quality by not being quite on the mark—or even by being wrong” (Winnicott, 1969, p. 718).

— Govrin, Interpretation，第四章（引 Winnicott, 1969, p. 718）

（三）诠释可以被无条件撤回：

In “The Use of an Object” (Winnicott, 1971a), he writes: “The analyst feels like interpreting, but this can spoil the process, and for the patient can seem like a kind of self-defence” (p. 92).

— Govrin, Interpretation，第四章（引 Winnicott, 1971a, p. 92）

（四）沟通发生在过渡空间中，意义由此共现而非被强加：

Communication takes place in what he calls the “transitional space between analyst and patient” (Phillips, 1988, p. 138)—a shared area of creative possibility where meanings can emerge collaboratively rather than being imposed by interpretive authority.

— Govrin, Interpretation，第四章（引 Phillips, 1988, p. 138）

【综合】这四条技术的共同结构是：分析师主动放弃「知道得更多」这一位置。因为一旦分析师成为真假的裁决者，过渡空间就被质疑、被消解，病人就从「创造」退回「顺从」——Govrin 明确指出，这会催生**假自体（false self）**式的配合：病人可以在世界上运作良好，却感到根本性的不真实（Govrin, Interpretation，第四章）。

治疗的任务因此被重新表述：

The therapeutic task becomes creating conditions within which the patient might finally experience the illusion of creating what they find—not through regression to literal infancy, but through the provision of a relationship that can be used creatively rather than merely adapted to.

— Govrin, Interpretation，第四章

而分析师的工作被列为三种可轮换的选项：

Sometimes this means interpretation, sometimes holding, sometimes surviving the patient’s use of the analyst as a transitional object.

— Govrin, Interpretation，第四章「Conclusion」

六、与分析性第三方（analytic third）的理论亲缘

Govrin 在第六章把分析性第三方定位为「对传统精神分析认识论最激进的背离」，其表述与过渡空间高度同构：

The concept of the analytic third represents perhaps the most radical departure from traditional psychoanalytic epistemology, fundamentally reconceptualizing where interpretation originates and how therapeutic meaning emerges. Neither residing in the patient’s unconscious waiting to be discovered, nor in the analyst’s mind waiting to be delivered, interpretation in this model emerges from what Thomas Ogden (2004) calls the analytic third—a jointly created unconscious space that exists between and beyond both participants.

— Govrin, Interpretation，第六章「The Analytic Third: Interpretation as Emergent Property」

其辩证结构几乎是过渡空间悖论的翻译版：

This third is not simply the sum of two subjectivities, but rather a dialectical creation that simultaneously preserves and negates the separateness of each participant.

— Govrin, Interpretation，第六章

而分析师的角色是主人（host），不是作者：

The analyst serves as what Ogden calls a “host” to the analytic third, maintaining conditions for its existence while remaining open to being transformed by what emerges within it.

— Govrin, Interpretation，第六章

时间性上的特征也与「既被创造又早已在那里」同构：

An analyst might offer an understanding that neither participant could have articulated before, yet once spoken, it seems to have always been true. This is not because the interpretation revealed something hidden but because it emerged from and gave form to the inchoate experience of the third.

— Govrin, Interpretation，第六章

【原文】 必须如实标注一处重要的文本事实：在奥格登本人的 Ontological Psychoanalysis（2019）全篇中，「analytic third」一词仅出现在文末参考文献（Ogden, 1994, The analytic third—working with intersubjective clinical facts），正文一次未用。奥格登 2019 年用来表述「第三领域」的语言，恰恰是温尼科特的**「两个游戏区域的重叠」（见本页第四节）。因此，过渡空间与分析性第三方的亲缘，在奥格登的个人思想史**中是确实的（他 1994 年提出第三方，2019 年转而用温尼科特的语言表述同一地带），但本批资料中并无奥格登本人明确划等号的文本。此亲缘关系的具体论证出自 Govrin 第六章的归纳，属【综合】。

七、埃谢尔的更激进占用：超出主体间性的环境性关联

埃谢尔认为自己的「临在（presencing）」与「同在（withness）」不止于两个主体之间的事，这与过渡空间作为「既非内在亦非外在」的第三领域形成呼应，但推得更远：

It is primarily an interconnected relatedness, rather than an interactive relationship, and it concentrates on the ontological (being) quality of the analytic experience that is lived through with the analyst, rather than on epistemological and interpretive qualities.

— Eshel, Withness，WHAT KIND OF ANALYTIC PRESENCE AND “WITHNESS” WOULD THAT BE?

“Presencing” and interconnectedness go beyond the level of interactions and patient–analyst relationships (object or subject relationships), even beyond intersubjectivity, to offer the opportunity for getting in touch with basic (environmental) relatedness and formative experiences of being and becoming

— Eshel, Withness，同节

她把这一层级明确划为第三种分析功能——与诠释性探索相对的、处理最未分化心理功能区的转化：

3. Transformation in O, when dealing with the most non-thought, unknown, undifferentiated zone of psychic functioning (Winnicott, Milner, late Bion, late Lacan). Rather than epistemological exploration (knowing), the focus here is on the unknown and unknowable, ultimate, emotional reality-O, the primacy of being at-one with the patient’s emotional reality, and a lived, new experience.

— Eshel, Withness，同节

埃谢尔引奥格登 2001 对温尼科特「共同活过一个经验（live an experience together）」的赞叹，为本页提供了一个交汇点——奥格登在此明确把温尼科特的这一措辞读作精神分析范式的转换：

Ogden (2001) beautifully amplifies this aspect of Winnicott’s thinking: “‘Live an experience together’—what makes the phrase remarkable is the unexpected word ‘live.’ They do not ‘take part in,’ ‘share,’ ‘participate in,’ or ‘enter into’ an experience together: they live an experience together. In this single phrase, Winnicott is suggesting (though I think he is not fully aware of this as he writes this paper) that he is in the process of transforming psychoanalysis, both as a theory and as a therapeutic relationship” (pp. 226-227, italics in original).

— Eshel, Withness，注 2（引 Ogden, 2001, pp. 226–227）

⚠️ 矛盾标注
议题：过渡空间／游戏区域与「分析性第三方」是否同一事物；以及这一地带究竟是两人之间的共构，还是超出两人的维度？
A 方立场：Govrin 归纳的关系取向——第三是「两人共同创造的无意识空间」，是辩证的产物，且同时保存并否定双方的分离性——「This third is not simply the sum of two subjectivities, but rather a dialectical creation that simultaneously preserves and negates the separateness of each participant」（Govrin, Interpretation，第六章）。这一模型仍是双人心理学的精致版本。
B 方立场：埃谢尔——「临在」与相互贯通超出互动、超出客体／主体关系、甚至超出主体间性，触及的是基础性的（环境性）关联——「even beyond intersubjectivity, to offer the opportunity for getting in touch with basic (environmental) relatedness and formative experiences of being and becoming」（Eshel, Withness）。她明言这「不是一人心理学，也不是互动式的两人心理学」，而是「patient and analyst become an emergent two-in-one new entity」。
备注：这属于不可通约的范式差异，非术语之争。A 方保护了双方的分离性与分析师的责任，B 方则主张存在论上的不可分。温尼科特本人的立场（经 Govrin 与 Ogden 转述）介于两者之间：过渡空间既要求分离（「保持内在与外在现实既分离又相互关联」），又要求重叠（「两个游戏区域的重叠」）——它同时是第三项，又依赖于两人的各自独立。参见 comparison-withness-vs-analytic-third。

关键引文

1. … an intermediate state of experiencing, to which inner reality and external life both contribute. It is an area that is not challenged, because no claim is made on its behalf except that it shall exist as a resting-place for the individual engaged in the perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality separate yet interrelated.
   — Ogden, Ontological，第二节（引 Winnicott, 1971c, p. 2）

2. The important point is that no decision on this point is expected. The question is not to be formulated.
   — Ogden, Ontological，第二节（引 Winnicott, 1971c, p. 12，原文着重）

3. In health the infant creates what is in fact lying around waiting to be found. But in health the object is created, not found … This has to be accepted as a paradox, and not solved by a restatement that, by its cleverness, seems to eliminate the paradox.
   — Ogden, Ontological，第二节（引 Winnicott, 1963, p. 181，原文着重）

4. Psychotherapy takes place in the overlap of two areas of playing, that of the patient and that of the therapist.
   — Ogden, Ontological，第一节（引 Winnicott, 1971a, p. 38，原文着重）

5. Communication takes place in what he calls the “transitional space between analyst and patient” (Phillips, 1988, p. 138)—a shared area of creative possibility where meanings can emerge collaboratively rather than being imposed by interpretive authority.
   — Govrin, Interpretation，第四章（引 Phillips, 1988, p. 138）

6. Sometimes this means interpretation, sometimes holding, sometimes surviving the patient’s use of the analyst as a transitional object.
   — Govrin, Interpretation，第四章「Conclusion」

关联

• 相关实体：person-donald-winnicott、person-thomas-ogden、person-ofra-eshel、person-aner-govrin
• 相关概念：concept-holding-going-on-being、concept-analytic-third、concept-withness、concept-analytic-presencing、concept-epistemological-vs-ontological、concept-interpretation、concept-dreaming-the-patient、concept-selfobject-empathy
• 参见主题：comparison-withness-vs-analytic-third、topic-interpretation-across-schools

引用来源

• ogden-ontological-psychoanalysis — 第二节为过渡客体与过渡现象的全部定义性引文来源（引 Winnicott 1971c 与 1963）；第一节提供「游戏区域重叠」「编织异己客体入个人图式」；第四节提供温尼科特非客体关系理论家的划界
• govrin-interpretation — 第四章提供根本悖论、错觉、过渡空间中的沟通与诠释撤回技术；第六章提供分析性第三方的完整表述
• eshel-withness — 提供「临在」超出主体间性的划界表述、第三种分析功能的划分，及注 2 所引 Ogden (2001) 对「共同活过一个经验」的阐释

引文处理说明：原始 PDF 转 Markdown 时产生的三类排版伪影在引文中已按原刊印刷形式还原——断字连字符（presen- cing → presencing）、跨行断字被误插的斜体标记、以及缺失空格（Winnicott 1971c,p.14 → Winnicott 1971c, p. 14）。Govrin 原文中标引年份的下划线标记 <u>…</u> 已去除。第六节的文本事实核查（奥格登 2019 全篇 analytic third 出现次数）经 Grep 核实，正文 0 次、参考文献 1 次。

变更记录

• 2026-08-29: 初始创建，来源 ogden-ontological-psychoanalysis、govrin-interpretation、eshel-withness。第六节如实标注奥格登 2019 全篇未使用 analytic third 一词；第七节以矛盾标注处理过渡空间／第三方与相互贯通的范式差异。