yadlin-gadot-truth-axes

SHLOMIT YADLIN-GADOT TRUTH AXES

TRUTH AXES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF SELF

Shlomit Yadlin-Gadot

Freud adhered to the idea that psychoanalysis is a science and that truth is one. The transition from a realistic epistemology to an epistemology of subjective idealism in psychoanalytic thought was accompanied by the splintering of the “one” realistic truth into a multiplicity of truths: realistic-correspondent, ideal, subjective- existential, intersubjective, coherent, and pragmatic truths. The present paper, employing the concept of “truth axes,” explores these truths as they relate to basic human needs, self- states, and the structuring of subjectivity. Truth axes are posited as organiz- ing principles of the psyche aimed at achieving stable images of reality across critical dimensions of the subject’s life. Personality and experience render some axes dominant, while others remain foreclosed and dissociated. In this construal, the psychoanalytic process concerns the detailing, depicting, and understanding of the various truth axes. The psychological definition of truth il- luminates its relation to clinical objectives and methodologies and emphasizes the ethical dimension involved in prioritiza- tion of truths. These ideas are illustrated by clinical vignettes.

From its very inception, psychoanalysis has defined its essence in terms of the pursuit of truth (Freud, 1933). Freud, in his early work as a modernist, strove to establish psychoanalysis as a sci- ence in search of truth as constructed in the framework of a real- istic epistemology. Truth was the goal of psychoanalysis, the ana- lyst’s gift to his or her patient, the therapeutic factor in clinical practice. Following Freud, however, an epistemological shift was gradually effected in psychoanalytic thought. The transition from a realistic epistemology to an epistemology of subjective idealism was accompanied by the splintering of the “one” correspondent truth into a multiplicity of truths: Ideal, subjective, intersubjec- tive, coherent, and pragmatic truths appeared, respectively, in the

work of Wilfred Bion, Heinz Kohut, Donald Winnicott, Donna Orange, Roy Schafer, and Donald Spence. Truth remains the raison d’ךtre of psychoanalysis (Hanly, 1990), but its various definitions have resulted in the formulation of dif- ferent objectives and methodologies for clinical psychoanalysis. Some professionals aim to unearth a historical-factual truth that necessarily surfaces with free association. This implies a focus on memories, dreams, and loosely connected discourse. Others see coherence as a measure of truth and aspire to construct a nar- rative truth, a truth that best creates a comprehensible and ac- ceptable life story (Schafer, 1996). Still others endeavor to bring out a subjective truth, a truth that reveals a person’s innermost vulnerabilities and requires particular safety conditions for its emergence, such as empathy, gentleness, and mirroring (Kohut, 1959, 1982). These different perspectives on truth, organized in distinct theoretical discourses, split the psychoanalytic society into diverse schools. The discussions among them are often accompanied by antagonism, rejectionist critiques, and difficulties in mounting real dialogue (Cavell, 1983, 1998; Summers, 2008). In the tradi- tional psychoanalytic discussions of epistemology, each school takes a position that attests to the “correctness” of a particular epistemology and explains its advantages as a framework for psy- choanalysis, while arguing that other epistemological approaches are erroneous and may even endanger psychoanalytic practice. The view that I wish to develop here does not propose to choose between epistemologies, but rather continues a line of thought that seeks to create the theoretical space for multiple epistemologies and the practical space for multiple truths, recog- nized as inherent features of our psychic function. Articulating a psychological definition of truth, this paper will depict truth as a psychic dynamic that functions in accord with the human need for certainty as it expresses itself across critical dimensions of the subject’s life. My psychological inquiry of truth assumes the Kantian idea that what we experience as an external world is only that part of reality that is accessible to our consciousness. Experience is mediated by fixed categories of consciousness that structure per- ceived phenomena in particular ways (Kant, 1781). Following this stage of perception, our experience is further organized by means

of attention and symbolic paradigms (James, 1890; Kuhn, 1962; Neisser, 1967, 1976). Symbolic paradigms organize elements of perception, emotion, and thought and thus provide us with or- ganized and relatively stable representations of reality (see also Gedo, 1997). The history of Western philosophical thought has given rise to six paradigmatic notions of truth, truths that frequent our lan- guage as well as clinical experience, philosophical theory, and psychoanalytic meta-theory. I will present each of these truths as reflecting an organizing principle in the psyche and as constitut- ing its Archimedean point of certainty. Each organizing principle selects and organizes disparate elements of perception, emotion, and thought, and enforces certain rules of combination among them. Every organization of this kind produces a distinct image of reality, together with a definable self hood that resides within it. These images sometimes overlap but are often incompatible and generate tensions within the psyche. I term these organiza- tional principles “Truth Axes.” In each person’s psyche, these principles of organization func- tion simultaneously, embodied in distinctive cognitive, experien- tial, and emotional modes. Their unique configuration is shaped by a singular developmental history that enhances certain axes, inhibits and forecloses others and, in that way, determines their interrelations. These conceptualizations of psychic functioning lead to the conclusion that one of the key therapeutic objectives of psychoanalytic work hinges on the processing of the particular outputs of each axis and the understanding of the dynamic move- ment among them. In the first part of the present article, “Truth as Need,” I pres- ent the psychological and philosophical rationale for conceptual- izing truth as a psychic principle rooted in a basic human need. In the second part, “Truth Notions and Psychoanalytic Theory,” I present the expression of this need in six paradigmatic notions of truth and their reflection in psychoanalytic theory. The third part of the article, “From Truth Notions to Truth Axes,” articulates the truth notions explored as principles of psychic functioning, relat- ing them to basic human needs, self-states, and psychic topology. In the fourth part, “Truth Axes and the Psychoanalytic Clinic,” I discuss the clinical significance of this conceptualization and il- lustrate it with three short clinical vignettes.

TRUTH AS NEED

The concept of truth conveys a belief in the possibility of cer- tainty, stability, and infallibility. However, any and all attempts to define truth belie this possibility. Philosophical thought has not achieved a consensual definition of the concept and the various paradigmatic definitions available are riddled with methodologi- cal, logical, and ethical challenges (Kunne, 2003). Mastering truth affords a sense of balance, security, coherence, and peace of mind (Dewey, 1960; Nietzsche, 1886; Peirce, 1877; Taylor, 1998). Psychological research has repeatedly shown the tendency of the mental apparatus to strive toward states of equa- nimity. Psychic forces maintain balanced structures, while states of instability drive the mind to continue searching for coherence and homeostasis (Heider, 1946, 1958; Rosenberg & Abelson,

1960). Mental processes stay in motion, stabilizing only when ac- quiring structural qualities like “good form” (Heider, 1960), “op- timal order” (Markus & Zajonc, 1985), “consonance” (Festinger,
1957), or “balance” (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Rosenberg & Abel- son, 1960; Simon & Holyoak, 2002; Tannenbaum, 1968). A whole range of mental states, such as clarity and certainty, is intuitively translated into states of truth (Rorty, 1989, 1998). We feel guided by truth and driven toward it; we cannot define it clearly and yet persist in searching for it. Truth casts its shadow on the content, form, and process of our thoughts and experience. The pertinence of the question of truth and the tension aroused by the different answers to it is already evident in ancient Greek philosophy. Thus, for example, Plato’s theory of eternal forms clashed with Protagoras’s notion of “man being the measure of all things,”
1 a notion that leaves everything open to interpreta- tion and contradicts the possibility of a single truth. The eternal nature and objectivity of Plato’s “idea” was pitted against the dan- gers of subjectivism, relativism, and the loss of the meaning of “truth.” Aristotle’s (350 b ce) “substances” remedied something of the injury to the senses that Plato’s “eternal forms” had inflicted, proposing a realistic epistemology that retains the difference be- tween true and false, as well as between the objective and the subjective. Kant and Hegel challenged Aristotle’s distinctions. They claimed that we live in a realm of phenomena, where all sense data,

at any time, are given to transformation, forcing us to relinquish the idea of sense-based absolute truth. They paved the way to the so-called “linguistic turn,” which posited meaning as prior to fact and claimed that our access to reality is biased by linguistic and conceptual schemes, thus further challenging our ability to know objective reality or even define its basic characteristics (Russell,

1961). And yet, the linguistic turn did not end in a stoic relinquishing of “truth” as a basic constituent of the mind’s work. Indeed, latter- day thinkers, for whom the linguistic turn was pivotal*,* also contin- ued to debate the concept of truth and show its complex nature in novel ways (Rorty, 1989). Even in the face of the wide range of epistemological, logical, and ethical arguments, the quest for truth continued, defining and redefining its status and method, taking into account its problematic nature and criticizing earlier arguments. The vital continuance of the search for truth begs the question of its intractability. What drives this search? What are its origins? The history of philosophical thought suggests that the answer to this question is clearly of a psychological nature: Human beings have a need for certainty, security, control, and the elimination of doubt. Nietzsche’s (1886) critique of metaphysics is accepted as a prime modern origin of the line of thought that led to the dismantling of our naive belief in metaphysics inasmuch as it aspires for ab- solute truth on the one hand and explores the immense human attachment to this absolute truth on the other. In Nietzsche’s view, the quest for truth is driven by our fears. When we aim for objectivity we buy ourselves stability and direc- tion, but we sacrifice our integrity and the vitality of our thought (Nietzsche, 1886, clause [cl.] 10). The “Will to Truth” is character- istic of a more general psychological tendency for self-deception. People lack the courage and integrity needed to contain their nat- ural curiosity (Nietzsche, 1886, cl. 227). Humanity, ever attached to a thoroughly flawed idea called “truth,” actively represses its creativity and life forces. The American Pragmatic view, influenced by Nietzsche’s thought, posited that the concern of truth was to advance the wel- fare of the individual. Thinkers such as Charles Sanders Peirce, William James (1907), John Dewey, and Richard Rorty (1989) saw truth as a means to an end of improving humanity’s lot. On the

other side of the ocean, Heidegger (1996) saw truth as reflecting humanity’s need to control the world in general and death in par- ticular. Levinas (1969) and Derrida (1978) both associated meta- physics with violence, seeing truth as a result and a paradigmatic example of an illusory purity that humanity tried to place as a guarantee of identity and superiority, with the result of a looming xenophobia. Notwithstanding the differences in content, all of the preced- ing views suggest that the pertinence of truth is of a psychological nature: Human beings have a need for certainty, constancy and mental control. Contrary to naive intuition, and many philosophical positions, this implies that what truth satisfies are not states of affairs, but rather states of mind. If until now the search for truth involved three orders—reality, propositions, and the constraints of human consciousness—we now add a fourth order: that of the psychologi- cal needs of the subject-as-thinker. This is neatly captured in the clever aphorism proposed by Jacques Lacan (1998): For the physi- cist, where there is smoke there is fire, but for the psychoanalyst where there is smoke there is a smoker. The need for truth is an overarching need for certainty and it expresses itself across the different dimensions of the subject’s life.

TRUTH NOTIONS AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

Six Truth Notions In a comprehensive review of the history of the idea of truth, I identify six paradigmatic notions of truth (Yadlin-Gadot, 2016): Correspondent, Coherent, Ideal, Intersubjective, Subjective-Exis- tential, and Pragmatic truths (for clarity, I shall denote them with capital letters). 2 In the following section I will briefly present their definitions and their associated epistemological premises. I will then relate these premises to subjectively experienced images of the world, thus effecting the transition from the philosophical to the psychic. The Correspondent conception of truth, introduced by Ar- istotle (350 b ce), maintains that truth values are established by correspondence between a proposition and an external mind- independent fact. Correspondent truth is anchored in a realistic

epistemology that posits the subject’s ability to know the mind- independent world by means of his or her senses (Hetherington,

2012). The Coherent conception of truth as, for example, in Spinoza’s thinking (1677), determines truth values by examining the com- patibility of a belief with a whole system of beliefs. A coherent theory of truth, rooted in an idealistic epistemology, leads to an “essential softening” of truth. A belief is true to the degree that it coheres with other beliefs (Hempel, 1935). The Ideal conception of truth, as in Plato’s (380 b ce) thought, determines truth values by the compatibility between particular beliefs or empirically perceived cases and their corresponding eternal decrees or forms. It is situated in the realm of “objective idealism” that claims the existence of a mind-independent order inaccessible to the senses and partially known by means of labori- ous mental processes (Russell, 1961). Subjective Idealism shares the premise of absolute and objec- tive idealism, that all known reality resides within the mind. But whereas the latter assumes a principle external to the system that creates and unifies it, the former assumes the “I” or the Ego as the constituting source of reality. Subjective and Intersubjective truths are embedded in the assumptions of subjective idealism (Orange, Stolorow, & Atwood, 1998). The Subjective-Existential conception of truth, seeds of which can be found in the work of Kierkegaard, perceives truth as highly personal, embodying the subject’s experienced authenticity. Here, experience is prior to any essence or generalization (Elleray, 2007). The Intersubjective conception of truth regards objectivity as established by interpersonal agreement, sometimes explicit, often implicit. This truth reflects the logic of intersubjective epistemol- ogies, whereby the world achieves its true transcendence through the presence of a foreign subjectivity (Husserl, 1983). Pragmatic truth concerns the usefulness and practicality of an idea in the context of the believer’s life. A true belief is one that has been proven valid by the compatibility between its pre- dictions and its results. Here, truth is process based, and tomor- row, today’s truth may be no more than an opinion (James, 1907,
1912).

Epistemology in Psychoanalytic Discourse In the last decades of psychoanalytic thinking, the epistemological focus has shifted from realism to idealism, from a Correspondent concept of truth to an Intersubjective one. Psychoanalytic truth in contemporary thought is often understood as constructed (or co-constructed) by interpretations and employs criteria of “useful- ness,” as pertains to improvements in the patient’s condition. This conception of truth diverges sharply from Freud’s con- ception of it. For Freud, the Correspondent theory of truth was there to anchor the standing of psychoanalysis as a science and to supply a rationale for clinical psychotherapy. In The Question of a Weltanschauung, upholding Aristotle’s concept of truth, Freud (1933) leaves no doubt as to which path psychoanalysis should follow: “Scientific thinking[‘s]… endeavor is to arrive at cor- respondence with reality… This correspondence with the real external world we call ‘truth’” (p. 169). 3 The separateness of the external and internal worlds has always been a cornerstone of the Freudian theory of pathology and development, as in meta-theo- retical assumptions. The Freudian infant gradually and painfully moves from an internal world of wish fulfilment to a frustrating grasp of external (yet sustaining) reality, transforming an early “pleasure-ego” into a “reality-ego” (Freud, 1911). The areas where the delineation of external and internal fails are those of neurosis and psychosis, and it is there that the subject, due to lapses in reality testing, loses hold of his or her Correspondent truth and allows Subjective-Existential truths to prevail. The latter is based on correspondence to psychic reality and the former on corre- spondence to external reality. In this view, truth that critically relies on internal reality is the hallmark of neurosis and needs to give way, by means of the analyst’s interpretations, to Correspondent truth. The analyst re- mains able to differentiate between the external and the internal truths even when his or her patient cannot. In the form they take in the Realistic-Correspondent meta-theory, both truths (Corre- spondent and Subjective-Existential) are found or revealed; they are neither constructed nor co-constructed. The Kleinian infant, like the Freudian one, begins life in a real- ity that is wholly phantasmatic and internal (Klein, 1930, 1932). Gradually, through such mechanisms as splitting, projection, in- trojections, and identification, the differentiation of internal and

external worlds evolves. Klein’s concept of “position” implies the ability to move in and out of depressive reality-testing. Winnicott’s (1969) move from the experiential realm of “relating” to “usage” (1969) reflects the same sensibilities as regards the delineation of inner and outer realities. However, Winnicott (1951) is the first to define as an autonomous entity the transitional realm that which stands between the inner and the outer realities. Winnicott’s third area of intermediateness collapses the internal–external/subject– object divide that is inherent in the notion of Correspondence. 4 In this sense he is effecting an epistemological shift*, but only within* this third area of experience. Outside of it, we may still make clear the differentiation of inner and outer, psychic and external real- ity. Whereas Winnicott maintains the traditional dualism of world and self, values begin a movement of reversal because the inner “true” is valued more highly than before. The transitional realm is understood as the source of meaning, subjectivity, and culture, and its constitution and analysis become the main focus and inter- est of psychoanalysis. Here, Winnicott distances himself from the classical notion of preexistent truths and forms a new understand- ing of knowledge as a process of becoming. Freud wanted ego where there was id. Winnicott, endowing the id with the respect- ed adjective of “true,” offers it vindication. Winnicott’s chaperon- ing of Subjective-Existential truth and the transitional realm he created might well have played a part in the gradual legitimation of idealistic trends in psychoanalysis. Kohut’s self-psychology positioned itself in a similar manner. The self psychologist validates the patient’s concept of reality even if it conflicts with the “objective” reality the therapist is familiar with (Kohut, 1984). The core area of psychoanalytic metapsychol- ogy occupies, for Kohut, an imaginary position inside the psychic organization of the individual, the position of an observer with whose insights the analyst vicariously identifies through the pro- cess of empathy. However, the point that remains valid in Kohut’s thought, as in the thought of his predecessors, is that inner and outer realities may be delineated by the analyst. The analyst strives to fortify the patient’s subjectivity and its truths, but he or she does this without losing the clarity of his or her hold on the dis- tinction between psychical and material realities. 5

The first radical shift in object relation theory from realism to idealism may be attributed to Bion, who delved deeply into issues of knowledge and truth. The following brief review will not do justice to his complex ideas, but may illustrate their part in effect- ing the idealistic shift. With the use of “O” and “K,” respectively denoting truth and knowledge, Bion articulates his late theory of knowledge: “O… the ultimate reality, represented by terms such as absolute truth, the godhead, the infinite, the thing-in-itself… does not fall in the domain of knowledge or learning save inci- dentally; O can ‘become,’ but it cannot be ‘known’” (Bion, 1970,

p. 25). For Bion, there is no convergence between K and O. This is because K is basically sense-based, while O is not (Bion, 1970, p.
87). Therefore, the psychoanalytic and the scientific truths (and realities) are fundamentally different from each other. Psycho- analysis must be “a science that is not restricted by its genesis in knowledge and sensuous background. It must be a science of at- one-ment” (Bion, 1970, p. 88). Only by means of “at-one-ment” may O be touched upon and approached. At-one-ment is a way of being or becoming that is not only different from knowledge, but is indeed obstructed by it. Near-O states, predicated on the departure from K, involve risking the loss of both meaning and the continuity of conscious- ness. Nevertheless, the event of “Becoming O” gives rise to psy- chic change. The subject is forced first to abandon K, hitherto fundamental in his or her consciousness, and then to return to it in order to bind the inchoate experience (Bion, 1965, p. 151). The transformation effected is an emotional learning that is al- ways mediated in an intersubjective fashion, predicated on the interaction between container and contained that transforms the indigestible into the thinkable. The relevant truth and reality for psychoanalysis (O in Bion’s case) can be experienced but cannot be known. Here is the down- fall of realistic epistemology, which is predicated on the assump- tion of a knowable reality. The method and criterion of O’s ap- propriation are completely subjective and experiential. Finally, ac- cessing any knowledge involves an intersubjective event; therefore, knowledge is necessarily infused with subjectivity and validated by it. These formulations may be viewed as “stepping stones” in the river of psychoanalytic thought, marking the gradual transi- tion from realistic to idealistic epistemology.

From a different direction, and by reference to Coherent and Pragmatic truths, Spence and Schafer did their part in effect- 6 ing the epistemic shift in psychoanalysis. Spence extended the purview of the Pragmatic approach in psychoanalysis, claiming that practitioners place the individual subject at the center of the psychoanalytic world and, as such, his or her well-being forms the criteria for truth. Spence described the therapeutic efficacy 7 of narrative (Coherent) and Pragmatic truths, but objected to accepting them as adequate substitutions for historical (Corre- spondent) truth. He warns that “microstructure analysis… may be our only defense against the perils of narrative persuasion” (Spence, 1983, p. 480), and advocates a return to the bedrock of realistic epistemology. In contradistinction, Schafer, basing his theory on these same Coherent and Pragmatic truths, demotes Correspondent truth from the privileged status Spence granted it. The basic assumption of what came to be called the “narrative approach” is that people construct stories of their lives in order to better understand them. The narrative rendered is always provi- sional, admitting potential retellings: “This point of view does not deny truth. There is plenty of truth. It is just that truth comes in different versions. It always has. In this regard, the entire matter may be formulated as one of giving up denials” (Schafer, 1996, p.

250). Two epistemological shifts are here effected. First, we part from the realm of realism and of biographical, Correspondent truth. Second, we relinquish monistic epistemologies in favor of parallel, potentially incongruent truths. Thus, Pragmatic, Subjec- tive, and Intersubjective epistemologies accept that several truths may be pertinent to a particular subject, when mental materials are contextualized in different areas and phases of a person’s life. This means that psychic realities do not lend themselves to uni- tary formulation. The narrative approach leans heavily on Coherent truth. How- ever, in the psychoanalytic context, it carries also a significant element of intersubjectivity inasmuch as the analyst, even only in the role of supplying the context and the legitimation of the telling, plays a role in the constitution of the patient’s narrative. Acknowledging the analyst’s influence in the evolving truth, we draw closer to an intersubjective epistemology. Here, observer and observed, analyst and analysand, are inextricably involved,

mutually and reciprocally determining themselves and their real- ity (Stolorow & Atwood, 1997). Different versions of the psycho- analytic understanding of reality have developed under the head- ing of subjectivist and intersubjectivist approaches, the common factor among them being the disbelief in the existence of one, 8 well-circumscribed objective reality. Here, the task of the analytic dialogue shifts from a classical concern with interpreting reality of any kind to an interest in the process by which analyst and pa- tient create and shape an impact on the other through the play of mutual influences.

The Relation Between Truth and Epistemology and the Question of Values Epistemology and truth are not one and the same, but they are interrelated*. Each epistemology has a notion of truth that it naturally* gives rise to. Thus, realistic epistemology is the natural home of Correspondent truth. Objective idealism, in which the Bionian 9 O may be situated, retains the possibility of objective truth but recognizes that the road leading to it is imbued with experiential subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Subjective epistemology grants subjectivity a transcendental function and therefore Subjective- Existential truths are the most valid here. In Intersubjective epis- temology, intersubjectivity (as expressed in truth, culture, or lan- guage) is a precondition for subjectivity and precedes it logically and epistemologically. Therefore, Subjective truths will always be colored by the intersubjective and, in a way, subordinated to it. Each epistemology, alongside its primary version of truth, also accommodates other truths, but values them differently. For example, Coherent truth is a pivotal and valid possibility in idealist epis- temologies, but it will be considered, at most, a narrative within a realistic perspective. In the same manner, the experience of Correspondence for a subjective epistemologist is, of course, an illusion. This has important implications for psychoanalysis. Sub- jective truths of the analysand have been given recognition from the early days of Freud, but they were regarded as neurotic symp- toms and mental health was asymptotic to the one objective truth. By contrast, Kohut and Winnicott acknowledged Correspondent truth but valued Subjective-Existential truth as expressing the core essence of being human and as the vehicle of therapeutic effect and progress. Spence acknowledged Pragmatic truth but warned

of its destructive effect on clinical methodology and objectives. Epistemologies may recognize various truths, but they favor the truth that is primary to them*. In the context of psychoanalysis, this* valuing of truths is reflected in the definition of therapeutic objectives and methodologies. Another way that psychoanalytic theories incorporate different truths (and determine their value and function in psychic life) is by means of their embodiment in psychic structures. In Freudian theory, for example, intersubjective truth appears as constitutive of the superego because, as a personality structure, the superego embodies socialization effected by parental agents. Intersubjec- tive truths internalized as personality structures are often depict- ed as being in conflict with other truths, embodied in different structures: Subjective-Existential, for example, as in Freud’s id or Winnicott’s True self. Freud advocates the supremacy of Corre- spondence as expressed in reality testing. Winnicott, of course, believing in the True self and its spontaneous, body-based creativ- ity, might find the reign of Correspondence restrictive, rendering emotional life poorer. A similar picture can be observed regarding Ideal truths. In certain psychoanalytic theories of personality, the Ideal truth ap- pears as a psychic structure, such as Freud’s (1914) ideal ego (p.

93). 10 In Kohut’s theory, the ideal appears in various forms, among them as a structural pole of the self that embodies content and motivational force. Most psychoanalysts would agree that ideals are often experienced as truths by patients. However, differences abound regarding their therapeutic use by analysts. Kohut’s belief that a life bereft of ideal truth is barren (Kohut & Wolf, 1978, p.
420) translates into methodology, where analysis offers a renewed possibility of development by means of idealizing relations with the analyst. Kleinians, on the other hand, find fault in the ac- ceptance of ideals as truth, suggesting the influence of splitting that acts as a defense in the face of aggression. Benjamin (1994) contends that the analyst who poses an ideal or as an ideal might seriously compromise the inquiry of the patient’s experiences of lack, weakness, and damage. Similar considerations apply to the analytic use of the Co- herent-narrative truth. Whereas for Schafer Coherent truth is a condition of communication and knowability and supplies sol- id structure for formulating and enhancing identity, Levenson

(1988) and Laplanche (2008) speak of narrative structures as defensive by definition, translating into congealed ego-language the inchoate mental richness of the unconscious. For Laplanche (2008), de-translation is the properly analytic vector, contrasted with the reconstructive, synthetic, defensive one. What is clear from this short discussion is that analysts from different psychoanalytic schools acknowledge the different truths that influence mental life generally and analysis particularly. But they ascribe their value differently, often as dictated by their epistemological convictions, and interpret differently the processes that are set in motion when pur- suing a particular truth. From the vantage point of the Ideal truth, Pragmatic truth may seem inferior. The reverse may hold as well, when Ideal truths are understood as defense against action, free- dom, and personal responsibility. As stated earlier, in traditional psychoanalytic discussions of epistemology, each school attests to the “correctness” of a particu- lar epistemology as a framework for psychoanalysis while argu- ing that other epistemological approaches are erroneous and may even endanger psychoanalytic practice. A review of these detailed discussions may be found in Yadlin-Gadot (2016). There is a line of work in psychoanalysis that may be identified as accepting the phenomenon of multiple epistemologies. Here, the plurality of epistemologies is grasped as an integral charac- teristic of mental life. The different images of reality that mani- fest themselves through the various epistemologies are seen as inherent to the interpretative construction of the world. Thus, no single structure renders other structures redundant, but rather re- lies on the way in which the other perspectives “capture” different aspects of mental life (Rosegrant, 2010; Schafer, 1995; Schermer,

2011). In these formulations, truth and, indeed, “reality,” are no longer conceived of as existing “out there” in the world, but rath- er as constituted by our epistemic and symbolic construals of the world, motivated by the demands of the psyche. In the next section I employ “truth axis” as a concept that cre- ates theoretical space for multiple epistemologies and the practi- cal space for multiple truths. These are recognized as inherent features of our psychic function, arising from the human need for certainty. When recognizing the various truths as rooted in the demands of the psyche, a different ethical approach to truth evolves.

FROM TRUTH NOTIONS TO TRUTH AXES

The thesis I present here construes the different paradigmatic truth notions as nodal points of certainty in the symbolic para- digms that organize our world and give rise to our images of re- ality. In order to understand them as such, one must put aside a number of common assumptions about truth. First, one must give up the idea that truth is one and absolute. Second, one must keep in mind that truth is inextricably tied up with the subject and determined by his or her needs. Third, truth is not static; it is not a specific point of reference regarding a particular fact or statement. Instead, it is a dynamic product of a long and gradual process of ordering. Fourth, different notions of truth do not in- validate each other. Each notion relies, in one way or another, on the way that another notion captures a different aspect of reality. The world is construed in accordance with our needs: We cre- ate the realities we need. In the words of philosopher and psycho- analyst Gemma Corradi Fiumara (1992):

… speaking of reality… we are not referring to the world in itself… but rather to the sort of reality which the individual laboriously carves out… as a construct negotiated within the limits of what may be thought and done within his symbolic ho- rizon… Before we decide to inhabit a specific epistemology… we may have gone through several epistemological migrations. (p. 8)

But as we have various needs we form various images of the world in accordance with them. Thus, we remain with different needs rendering their “inter- pretation”’ of the world that do not necessarily overlap or cohere. Each image of reality captures a possible, yet incomplete, aspect of experience. Its organic truth serves as a point of certainty within it. In each reality resides a characteristic self-state that is guided, directed, and motivated by its truth. The joining together of epistemic assumption, characteristic self-state, image of reality, and experienced truth form a truth axis. In that sense, a truth axis is a multidimensional mental domain. The truth axes, their products, and their motivational forces exist on all levels of mental activity, from basic experiences of sensation and emotion, to ground-level representations (memory, imagination, etc.), and

then to outlooks on life, both intuitive and formulated (e.g., in language). They give rise to the subject’s interpretations of the world, as well as to his or her experience of himself or herself.

Truth Axes, Psychological Needs, and Developmental Challenges To wit, truth axes organize the world in paradigmatic ways that are meant to provide stability and certainty across critical dimen- sions of the subject’s life. Each organizational principle provides for a deep emotional need that motivates its formulation. These needs unify each axis in a particular logic and motivate its development. Let me briefly sketch these needs. At the root of the Correspondent axis is the need to be in touch with external reality so as to enhance the chances of survival, through explaining, responding to, and anticipating events that influence the exchanges between a person and the mind-indepen- dent world around him or her. At the root of the Coherent axis of truth is the need for compat- ibility and harmony among a person’s beliefs, expectations, and behavioral tendencies. Coherence allows the smooth transition among the various activities that the subject is engaged with and allows him or her to create a sense of identity, continuity, and regularity across time (Dewey, 1929; Festinger, 1957; Swann & Brooks, 2012). Humanity’s need for perfection and completeness, for that which bestows guidance and meaning, and allows overcoming the repulsive, the abhorred, and the arbitrary, is at the root of the Ideal axis of truth. Ideal truths give people a sense of harmony and beauty, serving as both directives and sources of motivation (James, 1897; Kohut & Wolf, 1978). The Subjective-Existential axis arises in the subject’s need to be loyal to himself or herself, to be positioned at center stage as a criterion for planning his or her life and determining meaning without subordinating himself or herself to a universal concept of subject or truth (Laing, 1960; Sartre, 1956; Winnicott, 1960). The organization of experience in terms of future benefit is the basis for the Pragmatic axis of truth. This axis addresses the need to feel effective in one’s ability to achieve one’s goals in the world. It embodies active agency and overcomes the experience

of helplessness and inevitability (Bandura, 1997; James, 1912; Seligman, 1975). At the root of the Intersubjective axis of truth is the profound need for a connection with those around us and a shared reality with them (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fairbairn, 1946; Fromm, 1970; Shaw, 2003). At the center of this axis resides the represen- tation of the psychoanalytic object and the ability of the subject to cohere with the inner dynamics of this representation. This axis also generalizes the need for a singular object to the gratifying experience of belonging and cohering with a whole social field. Psychoanalysis illustrates that for the development of each of the axes the subject must engage in mental and emotional conflict and overcome a developmental crisis. Thus, in order for an indi- vidual to be able to constitute the axis of Correspondence, he or she has to be capable of establishing an inner reality as opposed to an outer one, and to be able to distinguish between them and compare the two. The first outline of the way in which the inter- nal as opposed to the external world is structured was offered by Freud, and the ability to delineate and distinguish between them became the defining characteristic of healthy development, com- promised in the context of neurosis and psychosis (Freud, 1923). The establishment of a Coherent axis demands, first and fore- most, the ability to connect between thoughts. A key concept here is Bion’s (1970) “link,” central in his theory of the development of thought. Linking concerns the ability to connect between a thing and a thought and between one thought and another. Linking is possible when an individual is prepared and able to fight against a defensive tendency to annul pain by leaving thoughts split and in disarray (Bion, 1970). The establishment of an Intersubjective axis demands the pres- ence of a subject whose existence and ability to constitute real- ity is equivalent to one’s own. Jessica Benjamin, following Win- nicott (1969) and the dialectic of Hegel’s (1807) Master and Slave, formulates the complex emotional process required in order to renounce oceanic narcissism, release the other from his or her status as object, and establish him or her as a subject. In order to establish an Ideal axis, a person needs to have ex- perienced a relationship allowing positive mirroring and idealiza- tion, one that could be internalized as a function of the personali- ty (Kohut, 1959). A Subjective-Existential axis is contingent on the

complex process that makes possible the genesis and existence of a “true” self. Only in relation to such an authentic self, which serves as a point of reference, can an existential and authentic axis of truth be formed (Winnicott, 1975). A Pragmatic axis of truth necessitates a flexible conscience that allows a person to behave in accordance with principles of self-benefit. In order for this axis to exist it is essential to have had the experience of influencing reality, together with functional flexibility and the ability to deal with vagueness (James, 1907). These allow the subject to act in the world without relying on established knowledge and only retroac- tively to form certainties regarding his or her actions. The potency of the axes of truth, which enables them to serve as guiding, organizing, and structuring principles of the psyche, is embedded in the basic need that led them to be established and in the developmental challenge surmounted in the process of their constitution.

Truth Axes, Realities, and Self-States Each truth axis yields a viable potential construction of the stream of consciousness and experience. As it organizes raw elements of experience in different ways, each gives rise to a distinct image of reality. The question of reality becomes a question of understand- ing the mutual relations between the different elements of a par- ticular organization and the transitions among them. The various truth axes coexist in consciousness as prisms through which vari- ous realities are construed, each giving rise to a different experi- ence of self and world. The Correspondent truth axis creates a “factual” reality, en- abling us to negotiate the mind-independent reality around us. In this reality we rely heavily on sense information, observe, and try to master the realistic constraints in which we live our lives. The Coherent truth axis produces for us a cohesive and consistent reality at the level of both personal identity and perceived exter- nality. This axis often functions to downplay the significance of facts and tendencies that do not cohere with one’s core beliefs about self and world. The Ideal truth axis embodies a reality to which we aspire and in which we believe. It exists within us and at times outside of us. We move toward its realization in many things we do and find guidance within it. The Pragmatic truth axis cre-

ates an image of reality that accommodates our objectives and interests. Here, we may plan and decide in ways that determine what may best enhance our well-being. We exist within it as active, initiating agents. The Subjective-Existential truth axis produces a person’s subjective-authentic image of reality, containing his or her private, often hidden truths. Finally, the Intersubjective truth axis creates the reality we share with those around us. Since truth axes differ in the needs to which they answer and the realities they create, they give rise to different experiences of the lived-in world. The vulnerable subjective self of inner truths, to which experiences of shame, exposure, and fear of annihilation are linked, differs from the matter-of-fact, realistic self of the cor- respondent axis. The self of the Intersubjective axis is the one sup- ported by agreement of its community, or lost within it, the one experiencing anxieties of alienation and questions of belonging- ness. The self that scrutinizes itself against its ideals and senses either guilt or satisfaction is once again a self that differs from the pragmatic one that aims to calculate and understand the ways reality could benefit it. Recurring patterns of world experience create different states of self in the form of balancing mechanisms (Bromberg, 2009; Mitchell, 1991; Rowan, 2010). The various states of the self are not perceived here as sporadic, infinite, or situational, which is the accepted position of many relational and postmodern writers (e.g., Bromberg, 2009; Gubrium & Holstein, 1994; Rowan, 2010). Rather, the different self-states are understood as subject to gen- eral alignments that correspond to the different truth axes; these alignments are universal and may be defined and described. In the final analysis, every truth axis has a unique grammar as well as different rules and priorities determining the possible combinations between elements of experience and thought. Thus, in the Coherent theory, elements are ordered and checked for truth value not by correspondence to reality, but by inner con- sistency. The Subjective-Existential axis, on the other hand, is not subject to rules of logic. It not only allows for paradoxes, but also establishes itself through the tensions within them. The present is dominant in the Subjective-Existential axis, negligible in the Ideal axis, and is but a step toward the future in the Pragmatic axis of truth. Sense data is pertinent in the Correspondent axis, is irrel-

evant for the Ideal axis, and provides a base for common significa- tion in the Intersubjective axis. The six organizing axes exist in the psychic space of every per- son in different forms and degrees of dominance. Each person may have one or two dominant axes, whose relation to other axes may vary considerably. One person may be more responsive to ideals, while another responds to the people around him and al- lows them to determine his aspirations, fears, and wishes. This person will probably experience a sense of belonging and creativ- ity when he is part of an establishment, while another person will only experience self-worth when she is guided predominantly by her inner truths. Every organizing axis can have constructive or pathological expressions but, in both cases, the underlying logic of truth will be apparent. Of course, a person does not always respond to events with the same logic of truth. Different contexts arousing different needs may activate one or another of the axes at particular times. Usually, one lives according to directives of various different truth axes simultaneously. Life, as we experience it, eclipses any one register, and is perpetually given in multiple significations. The therapist is attentive, even if not consciously, to various kinds of truth. While the therapist listens, he or she automatically and unconsciously considers a number of possible meanings in what is heard: The therapist examines what the patient is refer- ring to in the world around him or her; at the same time, the ther- apist scrutinizes the internal coherence of what is being said in relation to the speaker and in relation to what is understood to be his or her inner world. The therapist compares this inner world with the world as he or she experiences it and understands what he or she is being told according to the relevant social contexts. The therapist hears the various elements of the evolving narrative and, of course, experiences the meaning of the verbal message in terms of the impact of what is being said and the intentions he or she thinks gave rise to it. This rapid, complex, unconscious action of the therapist reflects features of communication and of the hu- man mind as depicted in the different truth notions.

TRUTH AXES AND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC CLINIC

The multiplicity of “truth” and “reality,” as it appears here, illus- trates the fact that, rather than trying to decide between differ- ent notions of truth, we relate to them as different perspectives that organize elements of perception, emotion, and thought in distinct and paradigmatic forms. However, this rapid and automatic consideration is rarely acknowledged. Moreover, psychoanalytic thought is fraught with battles among different theorists who advocate different epistemologies and truths, at times effectively devaluating others. From the perspective I present here, each psychoanalytic theory may be viewed as focused on one or two truths or epistemologies, creating a deep analysis of their evolution, from the level of need to the level of health, pathology, and therapeutic objectives. From this vantage point, the different psychoanalytic theories are not seen as competing, but as creating a theoretical arc that parallels the epistemic multiplicity of the mind. The analytic space is often construed as a space that is formed between analyst and analysand through transference and counter- transference, where meanings are created and played out (Ogden, 1993; Winnicott, 1971). This space dialectically and discursively links fantasy and reality, creating a “poetic” situation with a mul- tiplicity of figurative meanings, wherein the very possibility of meaningfulness arises. I suggest that, among other factors, this space may be constituted by the evolving shared ability of the ana- lytic dyad not to gravitate toward and collapse into one particu- lar axis of truth. Instead, patient and analyst develop the ability to analyze the way in which movement between axes is enabled, whether it “flows” or rather gets “blocked.” These features of in- ter-axial movement are determined by the relative dominance of each axis in the psyche, especially as they appertain to the various wishes and anxieties associated with them. In analysis, we can help our patients understand and articulate the different realities they inhabit. It may well be that, while do- ing so, we will discover the tensions and the difficulties that arise from the different intersections, tensions, contradictions, and in- compatibilities among these realities. We grant legitimacy to the various truths, admitting that life is too complex to be accounted for by one reality alone. We avoid retraumatization of our pa- tients who, in the past, may have had their Subjective-Existential

truths banned, their actual experiences ignored, their Pragmatic truths dismissed on moral grounds, their Ideal truths scoffed at, and so on. We learn the Intersubjective truths that shaped our patients’ sensibilities and probably co-construct with them some new ones. We may allow patients to know, acknowledge, and artic- ulate the multidimensionality of their living and its discontents. Thus, the patient can better inquire into the range of meanings and truths in his or her world by overcoming or circumventing the compulsion to determine particular meanings with which the patient identifies and which he or she may keep repeating. Axes of truth are not conceptualized as resting places, even if they may in fact fulfill such a function from time to time. Rather, the axes are viewed as having the potential to create continuous movement of images and meanings. Traditionally, the analyst based his or her authority on a truth which he or she knew, mastered, and employed. The analyst’s au- thority was undermined in the postmodern era by the relinquish- ing of a single truth. I ascribe here the analyst’s authority to his or her epistemic expertise, that is, his or her ability to know the epistemic layout of the psyche, recognize particular configura- tions in it, and make democratic and pluralistic use of a variety of languages. The analyst identifies the different appearances of each epistemic language on the levels of sensation, syntax, and encounter with the world. He or she recognizes the standing and relevance of any language in the entirety of psychic economy and structure, irrespective of his or her feelings, preferences, and identifications. The analyst is not expected to be neutral in his or her relation to the different languages, to equally identify with them, or to be devoid of natural preferences and tendencies. The analyst’s chal- lenge consists in being aware of these tendencies and their signifi- cance (Hoffman, 2009). For understanding the analytic stance I advocate here, it is pertinent to remember that, beyond preferenc- es and identifications, all truth axes express basic needs and are determined by them. Therefore, they all simultaneously exist in the psyche, even when not accessible to conscious experiencing or when experienced as averse. When initiating a dialogue of truth languages, these automatic need-driven processes are drawn into consciousness, delineating the ways meanings are determined and identifying the psychic balances of wish and anxiety on which

they are predicated. Thus the value-laden character of our prac- tice and its prioritization of psychic needs are acknowledged.

Clinical Illustrations All that we experience in the world is transcribed in our psyche in several discrete registers. Anything we experience is, in that sense, a multiple happening. Every issue in a person’s life appears differently through various images of reality that mentally expand the diverse and parallel conceptions of truth. This is true on both micro and macro levels of clinical analysis, as I demonstrate with the following clinical illustrations.

Paradox In the following lines I examine Winnicott’s elegant and master- ful therapeutic interventions as they may be described in truth terms. The case is directly quoted from “Playing and Reality” (Winnicott, 1971).

This concerns the treatment of a man of middle age… This man has had a long analysis [but] there is still something he avers that makes it impossible for him to stop… In the pres- ent phase of this analysis something has been reached which is new for me. It has to do with the way I am dealing with the non- masculine element in his personality.

On a Friday the patient came and reported much as usual. The thing that struck… was that the patient was talking about penis envy… Obviously this term, penis envy, is not usually applied in the description of a man. The change that belongs to this particular phase is shown in the way I handled this… I said to him: “I am listening to a girl. I know perfectly well that you are a man but I am listening to a girl, and I am talking to a girl. I am telling this girl: ‘You are talking about penis envy.’” I wish to emphasize that this has nothing to do with homosexual- ity.

… It was clear to me, by the profound effect of this interpreta- tion, that my remark was in some way apposite, and.. .did in fact break into a vicious circle. (pp. 72-73)

Winnicott begins by describing a therapeutic impasse. Years of therapy have not granted the patient an experience of well-being, and Winnicott realizes that he must search for something that is novel for the patient as well as for himself. He presents the patient with a startling interpretation that impacts the patient in a way that immediately reveals its validity: “On this occasion there was an immediate effect in the form of intellectual acceptance, and relief, and then there were more remote effects. After a pause the patient said: ‘If I were to tell someone about this girl I would be called mad’” (Winnicott, 1971, p. 72). Following the relief experienced, the patient immediately ad- dresses the contradiction that Winnicott’s interpretation created. It is inconceivable that someone would identify a man as being a woman, unless they are insane. Indeed that would be the case, as far as the grammatical rules of Correspondence and Coherence are concerned. The linguistic surface of this exchange may be described as follows: The statement “you are a girl” is false and, in that literal sense, meaningless. The reader searches for a nonliter- al meaning that may render the text comprehensible. One way of dealing with incompatibility of literal meaning is to substitute it with metaphorical meaning, such as a simile. The statement “the patient is a girl” is literally false, but the statement “the patient is like a girl” could be true, as in “the patient is like a girl in that he is experiencing penis envy.” Another would involve a change in the categories used to construe a given situation. Thus, for example, it is possible to resolve the incomprehensibility of the statement “the male patient is a girl” by understanding “male” as belonging to the category of sex, and “girl” as belonging to the category of gender, that is, understanding the male patient to possess girl- like characteristics. Winnicott, however, abstains from any such “arrangement,” thus challenging Correspondent logic, which is to say, not everything that is false according to Correspondent truth is false categorically and in all possible ways. In this way, he creates space for the introduction of additional truths into the analytic space. Having dealt with the subjects of sex and gender, Winnicott moves on to deal with the issue of insanity–sanity. Here too, he illustrates the ability of linguistic maneuvers to allow for paradox and contain it:

The matter could have been left there, but I am glad, in view of subsequent events, that I went further… I said: “It was not that you told this to anyone; it is I who see the girl and hear a girl talking, when actually there is a man on my couch. The mad person is myself.”

I did not have to elaborate this point because it went home. The patient said that he now felt sane in a mad environment. In other words he was now released from a dilemma. As he said, subsequently, “I myself could never say (knowing myself to be a man) ‘I am a girl.’ I am not mad that way. But you said it, and you have spoken to both parts of me.” (Winnicott, 1971, p. 73)

Clearly, Winnicott is in no hurry to part from the “madness” that his patient has introduced into the analytic discourse. On the contrary, he appropriates it. One can reasonably assume that Winnicott’s patient, given the firm bond between them, will not conclude that Winnicott is simply, literally mad. Rather, it would seem that Winnicott makes good use of the positive therapeutic alliance in demolishing yet another Correspondent truth, as given in the definition of insanity. When enabling madness and sanity to dwell together in his image, Winnicott models for the patient the way in which Correspondently or Intersubjectively defined op- posites, such as madness and sanity, may coexist simultaneously in the psyche, as do “boy” and “girl.” The authoritarianism of Correspondent truth has been under- mined. Its grammatical rules are no longer all-pervasive in the psyche. However, Winnicott does not try to banish Correspon- dence, only to bring it into dialogue with other axes. This is how we may understand also his subsequent intervention.

This complex state of affairs has a special reality for this man… We have very good evidence from inside the analysis that in her early management of him the mother held him and dealt with him in all sorts of physical ways as if she failed to see him as a male… it was the mother’s “madness” that saw a girl where there was a boy, and this was brought right into the pres- ent by my having said “It is I who am mad.” (Winnicott, 1971, p.

After articulating his paradoxical intervention, Winnicott returns to Correspondence, looking for biographical events that had a

role in creating his patient’s conflicts. The Intersubjective axis is introduced with the entrance of the truth-norm of sanity into the analytic space, imbuing it with the experiential materials of the axis, as expressed by fears of ostracism, derision, and exclusion. Winnicott volunteers to hold on to this “hot potato” of contradic- tion and paradox and later of madness, taking upon himself the risk of moving among truths, a move experienced here as border- ing on madness and reiterating the mother’s madness. Winnicott’s introduction of these truths into the analytic space creates for his patient the possibility of being exposed to them, of learning to speak them, of using their possibilities to symbol- ize and reveal what has formerly been dissociated. This dialogue among truths allows us to appreciate how fast-moving and unpre- dictable but critical shifts in attunement during the session may be retroactively understood.

The Act of Freedom The case cited in Symington’s (1983) “The Analyst’s Act of Free- dom as Agent of Therapeutic Change” illustrates once again the therapeutic effect involved in movement among truth axes, trig- gered by the analyst’s intervention. The case illustrates the po- tency of deconstructing an entrenched, Pragmatic truth by means of Correspondence.

I was charging Miss M a little more than half of what my other patients were paying. She had been a clinic patient and I used to sigh to myself and say inwardly, “Poor Miss M, £X is the most that I can charge her.” I did not in fact articulate it so clearly as that. In my mind it was like an acknowledged fact that everyone knows, like the unreliability of the English weather. It was part of the furniture of my mind and I had resigned myself to it in the same way as I reluctantly resign myself to the English weath- er. So the analysis went on and on with that assumption as its unquestioned concomitant until one day a startling thought oc- curred to me: “Why can’t Miss M pay the same as all my other patients?”

Then I remembered the resentment she frequently expressed towards her boss who always called her “Little Mary.” A cer- tainty began to grow in me that I… had been lassoed into the patient’s self-perception and I was just beginning to extricate

myself from it. I then brought up the question of her fee and in the course of a discussion she said, “If I had to pay more then I know I would.”

… For two sessions she cried rather pitifully but then became resolved that she would meet the challenge. Soon she found a job that paid her one third more than her previous salary. In changing jobs she extricated herself from the patronizing tute- lage of the boss who called her “Little Mary.”… Shortly after this she finally gave the push to a parasitic boyfriend. I think the source of these beneficial changes was in that moment of inner freedom—when I had the unexpected thought: “Why can’t Miss M pay the same as my other patients?” I am calling this act of inner freedom the “x-phenomenon.” (p. 283)

Symington suggests an elaborate explanation for the “x-phenom- enon” involving unconscious communication and an illusory corporate personality system shared by patient and analyst and dominated by elements of superego. The analyst’s act of freedom brings to consciousness the imperatives of this system and the ability to question them. This vignette can be alternatively understood through the prism of multiple epistemic perspectives that structure our world. Symington describes “Little Mary,” his patient, as construed along the Pragmatic axis, obviously a crucial one in her life. Little Mary inhabits a reality she cannot influence. Her helplessness in the face of parasitic and condescending behaviors reinforces them and marks her as incompetent and infantile, vulnerable, fragile, and in need of protection. Mitchell (1998) analyzes the metaphor of the infant and its sig- nificance in shaping clinical work. He states that, in psychoanalyt- ic thought past and present merge, since the past is understood as reconstructing itself again and again in psychic reality. Therefore, from a psychodynamic point of view, the “metaphored”–meta- morphosed patient is an infant, and we sometimes relate to him or her accordingly. Freud’s infant is a conflicted troublemaker, de- manding a firm hand and an abstinent manner, so that his or her prohibited desires may be analyzed and eschewed. By contrast, the modern infant (Symington’s) is seen as deserving of empathic understanding and requiring real experiences of nurturance in therapy in order to resume arrested development.

Symington’s moment of freedom involved a Correspondently determined thought that entered his mind: “Why can’t Miss M pay the same as all my other patients?” This thought was “startling” for the analyst, not a part of the “furniture of his mind.” This is mostly because the Correspondent axis was not the one structur- ing the reality of the analytic dyad. Despite that, being always ac- tive as an organizing principle of the mind, Correspondent axial construals continued to be generated in the analyst’s mind, albeit subconsciously. When the thought offered itself, Symington im- mediately recognized it as true (along a different axis from the one he had followed before) and allowed it into the therapeutic dyad, disordering its previously accepted truths. What followed the interpretation may actually be understood as an enactment of a Pragmatically related drama. When the Cor- respondent axis enters the scene, Symington discovers a margin of freedom he had lacked before and presents an intuitive inter- pretation that is startling and “ungrounded” in the context of its presentation. Now, this interpretation carries quite an impact. The startled and crying patient is engulfed in structural epistemic confusion. But what also exists in the session is the impact of the therapist’s movement and intention. Effectively, the therapist models effectiveness. He is not afraid to act. This is often the case with interpretations, but here, in the context of Mary’s malaise, it carries great weight. This combined influence undermines the formerly entrenched Pragmatic truth, and Mary experiences the new possibility of existing as an active agent in the world. In contemporary psychoanalytic literature, moments of free- dom are idealized as the unique intersubjective happenings that they indeed are. Nevertheless, applying truth terms to their anal- ysis may involve the introduction of prosaic, sober Correspon- dence into the realm of the poetics we all appreciate so deeply in our work.

An Adhesive Web of Intersubjective and Ideal Truths Bill is a high-functioning, intelligent, soft-spoken man in his thir- ties. He entered therapy with the complaint of ennui and dissat- isfaction in intimate relations. Bill was six when his father died of cancer, and he described close and warm relations growing up with his mother and two brothers. Bill’s mother worked long

hours as a stage designer and often brought the boys to her work- place, the theater, where they would eat and do their schoolwork beside her. Throughout the first two years of analysis Bill came regularly to sessions, and described his childhood, the loss of his father, the family’s bereavement. Bill’s father was remembered as a gentle man, an unsuccessful writer who had died young after a short struggle with cancer. Bill’s drama teacher throughout his middle and high school years emerged as a significant figure, a man that Bill had identified with and spoke highly of. He was vague about why they had not remained in touch. Throughout the third year of therapy Bill began a significant relationship with a woman that seemed to be more exciting and absorbing for him than previous relationships. Gradually, some sadomasochistic strains became apparent in it, and emerged also in his relations with me. He seemed averse to my empathy or to gentler handling, and asked me to “hit” him with stronger inter- pretations. Trying to mirror and articulate these changes in our relations opened a heretofore unspoken issue, a critical dimen- sion of Bill’s relations with his charismatic male drama teacher. We had previously discussed him in terms of a father-figure and spoke also of the fantasies he had entertained that this man and his mother would eventually develop a romantic relationship. What he now began to tell me about was that from the age of thirteen he had gradually developed a sexual relationship with this teacher. That this information had not formerly come up in therapy was for me intuitively indicative of shame, trauma, and dissociative processes. What strengthened this impression was the chronic wooden, opaque tone with which Bill now spoke of this relation- ship. The warmth and yearning that had formerly suffused this issue were gone, replaced by a wary detachment. The sexual rela- tionship between an adult and a boy was, for me, clearly an abu- sive one. I was struck by how seemingly unintegrated this “fact” was in Bill’s former narration of this relationship. It was as if he had totally split off the abuser–abused aspect of the relationship, and had for two years told me only of its supportive and loving aspects. I interpreted the aggressiveness toning our previously positive relationship as communicating something of the insult and injury that Bill had experienced. Somehow, all I said seemed to be get-

ting us nowhere; if anything, it was making Bill more suspicious and reserved. I was wondering about incest phantasies, oedipal guilt in relation to his dead father, and fears of power abuse and reenactment in therapy, but these themes seemed to carry no pragmatic truth in terms of moving the analysis on. On one occa- sion, experiencing Bill as perpetually distant, I tried to formulate what was happening to him and to me as a repetition of the effect of the abuse he had undergone. This was the first time I had used the word “abuse,” but its ef- fect was dramatic. Bill seemed to shake out of his foggy state and reacted with anger—fresh and vital. He retorted that the abuse he was experiencing was what was happening here with me. He said that he had sat here for years and I had understood nothing. I was totally confused. His ensuing monologue began clearing things up for me a bit. How dare I term his teacher an abuser? Not only had I termed him an abuser, I had reiterated the terrible insult he had felt at the time when he had told his mother about this relationship. She too had reacted “terribly,” indeed had filed a complaint with the police and had forced him to see a psychiatrist. I replied that she was probably worried and upset, trying to take care of him. To myself I was thinking that he identified with his aggressor. Bill did not show up for two sessions, and when I reached out to him he said he wanted to terminate therapy. I asked him to write me something, to explain to me what had happened. I told him that I realized that I was missing something. He wrote me that the relationship with this man was the place he had felt most loved and appreciated in his life. Ever since, no one could share or understand the extent to which degrading this relationship was a degradation of himself, of his judgment, of love itself. I wrote back that I realize that I had thrown the baby out with the bath- water. Bill returned to therapy, and through a prolonged struggle with myself, I wrenched myself from the way I had rejected his Subjective truth by subjecting it to my own truths. The next two years in therapy dealt mostly with his shame and anger, not with the “abuse” but with his environment’s inability to respect the meaning this sexual relationship had held for him. I had to loosen my hold on several truths that had a firm hold on me in order to work in this direction. Retroactively we understood his lack

of intimate relationships as his refusal to again and again experi- ence the usual construals of this relationship with his teacher. We worked on processing this issue with his current girlfriend, and their relationship deepened. Over time I could discuss with Bill the way he had split off the problematic aspect of his relationship with his teacher. Af- ter we had acknowledged the beauty, the ecstasy, the way he had felt loved and adored, and the way this had given him a “place” to be seen, Bill could begin to create additional perspectives on this relationship. Acknowledging the Intersubjective and Ideal truths that find such relationships abusive, he could surrender his long-cherished resentment and anger toward people close to him who had objected to this relationship. He no longer felt he had to avoid intimacy in order to avoid this painful negation of his truest feelings, now that they had been acknowledged. He could begin discussing his conflicted homosexual tendencies and the way he had felt lonely and unseen as a child, wondering at his quiet and self-absorbed father, yearning for his attention, wondering if and when his busy mother would sit with him, look at him, touch him. Bill’s therapy left me with many thoughts and questions. How far had I gone when I joined in his nostalgic yearnings for feel- ings he had experienced with this beloved lover–father figure? Was I colluding with perverse tendencies? Ignoring pedophilic pathology? I write these questions and leave them unanswered. They remain so as testimony to the intensity of conflict among different truths.

CONCLUSION

The thesis presented in this article touches on epistemological, metapsychological, and ethical issues. Despite the seeming com- plexity of these issues, I attempt to shed light on what is, in fact, done in the most intuitive way by clinicians. We are constantly listening to what has not been said, alongside what is being said. While listening to the information we are given, we attune to accounts, variations, and meanings that are present in different ways in the analytic space, tapping different levels of awareness. When an analyst’s conscious observation is directed through the prism of a certain epistemology—be it subjective, realistic, or in-

tersubjective, presenting a specific understanding of a particular object of analysis—it seems safe to say that he or she, in tandem, intuitively considers the totality of possible epistemologies and evaluates them for compatibilities, overlaps, conflicts, or tensions. The concept of the truth axes is, in a way, a formalization and articulation of part of our intuitive movements as therapists. This movement reflects our intuitive understanding of the way images of reality are constituted. From the perspective I present here, each psychoanalytic theo- ry may be viewed as focused on one or two truths or epistemolo- gies, creating a deep analysis of their evolution, from the level of need to the level of health, pathology, and therapeutic objectives. From this vantage point, the different psychoanalytic theories are not seen as competing, but as creating a theoretical arc that paral- lels the epistemic multiplicity of the mind. Acknowledging that all truth axes express basic needs and are determined by them draws together the dimensions of the therapeutic and the ethic. Creating dialogic relations between and among axes involves the articulation and portrayal of a truth axis, in its unique ability to contain, construe, and express an aspect of experiencing that cannot be contained or expressed by any other truth axis. I have stressed that these truths are not in competition with each other. Rather, they are complementary, arising from different needs and expressing their associated dreads and desires. Truth terms cap- ture the complexity of human experience as we encounter it in our clinical work. We often see our patients battling among their conflicting truths, baffled by the different ways in which they ex- perience one single event. The therapeutic objective here is not necessarily to resolve conflicts. Our work often consists of creating a space that may contain various versions of world, self, and experience, acknowl- edging and recognizing their validity, though they often do not cohere. At its best, this dialogue holds the potential of unraveling dynamics of dissociation and denial, allowing the experience of possibility and choice, in place of restriction and inevitability.

NOTES

As quoted in Plato’s Theaetetus (360 b ce).
Four of these notions appear most frequently in contemporary theory, both philosophical and psychoanalytic. These are the Correspondent, Coherent, Intersubjective, and Pragmatic notions of truth (Hanly, 1990, 2001; Kunne, 2003; Lynch, 2001). To these I add one classical notion, the Ideal truth, presented already by Plato. This truth is often considered obsolete outside religious contexts, but I will illuminate its enduring rel- evance in psychoanalytic theory and practice. I add also the Subjective- Existential truth, which appears in explicit and implicit ways in psycho- analytic theory and practice, reflecting its immense influence on psychic life. For a detailed account of the way these truths are delineated and placed in theoretic dialectic with further definitions, including mixed models and deflationary theories of truth, see Yadlin-Gadot (2016).
Freud repudiates “the anarchist theory” which argues that the criterion for truth—correspondence with the external world—is absent in the psy- choanalytic method. Freud (1933) criticizes such a view on the ground that “it breaks down with its first step into practical life” (p.175).
Winnicott’s (1949) concept of psyche–soma echoes the same sensibilities. Whereas in binary ontology the psyche and soma fall into the respective categories of inner and outer, for Winnicott this division is a distortion, similar to the one eventuating in a dominant false self that takes over space and functions from the true self.
I am presenting here my analysis of Kohut’s epistemology. Others, such as Gedo (1997), situate him in a phenomenological-subjective episte- mology: “Kohut (1977, 1978, 1984) and his followers… have founded a school of psychoanalytic thought conforming to the principle that our theories should be as near to personal experience as possible. As a result, the propositions of self-psychology deal only with issues that can be articulated in the language of subjectivity” (p. 782). Fosshage also perceives Kohut as updating psychoanalytic epistemology by means of the method of observation he introduced into the clinic. Kohut (1982) recognized “the relativity of our perceptions of reality,” as well as “the framework of ordering concepts that shape our observations and ex- planations” (Kohut, 1982, p. 400), and that “the field that is observed, of necessity, includes the observer” (Kohut, 1984, p.41). Deeming the patient’s subjectivity the principal focus of the analytic endeavor, Kohut (1959, 1982) delineated how our method of observation relies on em- pathy and vicarious introspection, what he called the “empathic mode of observation,” and designated it the method by which the field of psychoanalysis itself is defined (Fosshage, 2011, p. 140; Kohut, 1977). Thus, when all is filtered through the analyst’s subjective processing, epistemology transforms into the subjective-phenomenal.
As with many contemporary ideas, both referenced Freud in the develop- ment of their thinking. In 1937 Freud states that “an assured conviction of the truth of [the] construction… achieves the same therapeutic re-

sult as a recaptured memory” (p. 265). Freud engages here two notions of truth: the Coherent truth, appertaining to the fit between a newly formed construction and earlier conceptions held by the patient (“as- sured conviction”), and the Pragmatic truth, in which the construction is examined according to its therapeutic consequences (“the same thera- peutic results”). Freud forms here a new equation between the practical implications of a belief and its presumed objective truth-value.

Spence (1982) gives here a detailed definition of what he terms narrative truth and of its constitution: To the extent that a narrative is persuasive and compelling, it ac- quires features of what might be called narrative truth. Goodness of fit seems particularly significant in bringing about this change. A particular clinical event—an association, for example, or a partly re- covered memory—may seem to clarify the unfolding account of the patient’s life history so precisely that both patient and analyst come to the conclusion that it must be true… under these conditions, narrative fit is usually taken to be conclusive, and if a piece of the past completes the unfinished clinical picture in just the right way… then it acquires its own truth value and no further checking is necessary. Many of Freud’s constructions seem to have followed this path. What was originally hypothetical and problematic, possessing no known truth value, turns out to bring together pieces of the pa- tient’s life story which, up to that point, had seemed disconnected and even contradictory. The construction that began as a contribu- tion to the coherence of the narrative… gradually comes to acquire truth value in its own right and is assumed to satisfy the criteria of accuracy… As soon as that step is taken, the construction becomes a reconstruction—a piece of the past that is taken to be as real as the name of the patient’s father or the date of his birth. (p. 181)
Constructivist (Hoffman, 1991), Hermeneutic (Bouchard, 1995), and Perspectival Realism (Orange, 1992; Orange et al., 1998) are examples of approaches in psychoanalysis that contend that human behavior is not determined by reality, which cannot be known and therefore cannot be posited as existing in relations of causality, but by the constructions of human beings. These approaches vary in the degree to which they retain vestiges of realism. For a detailed discussion of the variations among these approaches, see Yadlin-Gadot (2016).
“The Platonic theory of Forms and the Christian dogma of the Incar- nation imply absolute essence which I wish to postulate as a universal quality of phenomena such as ‘panic,’ ‘anxiety,’ ‘fear,’ ‘love.’ In brief, I use O to represent this central feature of every situation that the psycho- analyst has to meet. With this he must be at one” (Bion, 1970, p. 88).
In “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” Freud (1921) again relates to the ego ideal as a configuration that is distinct from the ego and that enables the understanding of diverse phenomena in which the other is perceived as superior. This explains submission to hypnosis and to leadership, infatuation and admiration, and so on, when, according to Freud, the subject projects his or her ideal ego upon another person.

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